“One can have different views about the definition of genocide, but one may not use definitional disputes to deny genocide.”

In a tweet last year (that I just came across), the Lemkin Institute for the Prevention of Genocide, long captured by the far left, writes: “The Lemkin Institute has had it with the cynical lies and propaganda from Israel and the USA. One can have different views about the definition of genocide, but one may not use definitional disputes to deny genocide.”

Where to begin? If Party A and Party B are arguing over whether Israel is committing genocide, and Party A says, “genocide requires an intent to wipe out a large percentage of a civilian population defined by race, ethnicity, or religion, and action in accordance with that attempt, and that does not describe Israeli action in Gaza,” and Party B says, “Israel is committing genocide because I believe that it has a long-term plan to dispossess and expel all Palestinians, and the Gaza War is consistent with that plan,” *of course* the definitional dispute should be used by Party A to deny there is a genocide (and Party A could add that just because Party B believes something, doesn’t make it true!)

Let’s try out the Institute’s perspective in a murder case. Defense lawyers: “Ladies and gentleman of the jury, the definition of murder in this state requires both malice aforethought by the accused, and action resulting in the death of the victim. However, my client had no such malice, and the victim is still alive.” Lemkin: “Objection, we don’t think murder requires either malice aforethought or death, and one may not use definitional disputes to deny murder.”

How about a rape case: “In New California, the statutory definition of rape states there must be a lack of consent to sexual contact, and that contact must involve penetration of a bodily orifice. My client had both written and verbal consent to initiate sexual contact with the accuser and she has acknowledged to this court that there was no penetration of any orifice.” Lemkin: “Objection, we believe that rape is solely a matter of the intentions of the accused, and one may not use definitional dispute to deny rape.”

What Lemkin really seems to be saying is that if they want to accuse Israel of genocide because it suits their propaganda interests, how dare anyone object! Indeed, they pretty much say so: “Let us be clear: Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.” How do we know? “These are not political statements. They are statements that are made from knowledge and experience.” Oh, well that settles it.

Wait, there is more: “Nevertheless, you do not need a PhD , a law degree, or X-ray vision to see the genocidal dimensions of Israel’s carnage in Gaza.” No, but you do need an accurate definition of genocide.”

“It is clear in the behavior of the state and its military, on full display in yesterday’s horrific bombardment of a Rafah camp.” Classic example of saying something is clear to obscure the fact that it’s not only far from clear, you don’t have any evidence at all. As far bombardment of enemy territory, that’s pretty much what happens in a war, and war, as such is not genocide.

Lemkin’s social media people seem to be of the mindset of those who think if you say something with enough vigor, emotion, and anger, it means that people should believe you. But you know what you need to support a charge of genocide? First, you need an accurate definition of genocide. Then, you need evidence that the behavior of the state actor in question meets that definition. And if your definition of genocide is wrong in the first instance, than of course one can use that “definitional dispute” to deny there is genocide.

If it weren’t for the serious consequences of blood libel, I’d feel embarrassed for them.

The post “One can have different views about the definition of genocide, but one may not use definitional disputes to deny genocide.” appeared first on Reason.com.

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