IMF agreed with the Austrian Economics School, at least on the cycles.

From the officiale IMF web site:

Currency Crises in the Post-Bretton Woods Era: A New Dataset of Large Depreciations.

From page 19

The episodes are divided into three groups—advanced economies (AEs), emerging markets (EMs), and developing markets (DMs)

Large depreciations are more prevalent in countries with lower income levels. On average, a large depreciation episode happened once every 64 years in AEs, once every 17 years in EMs, and once every 15 years in DMs, using the default cutoffs for identification. A large depreciation event occurred every 50 years to AEs, every 11 years to EMs and every 10 years to DMs. When using the lower AE-specific cutoffs, AEs experienced large depreciation episodes every 19 years and events every 16 years.

Conclusions

This paper introduces a new worldwide dataset of large depreciation events and episodes from 1971 to 2024. It aims to help deepen the understanding of the dynamics, characteristics, and policy implications of currency crises by identifying large depreciation events with monthly precision and analyzing the evolution of exchange rates and price levels in the aftermath of these events.

The large depreciation episodes are grouped by income, REER trajectory, the existence of aftershocks, exchange rate flexibility, and IMF-supported program status. These groups help identify patterns within the dataset.

• Countries with lower income levels are more likely to experience large depreciations. In these countries, REER tends to overshoot more and peak later in large depreciation episodes.
• Stable depreciations are common, but not the rule. Large and sharp nominal depreciations are more likely to result in REER stabilizing by the end of the analysis window, provided inflation is kept in check.
• More often than not, significant real appreciations following the initial depreciation event are likely to be associated with inflation-depreciation spirals (i.e., inflation quickly eroding the initial real depreciation) and can thus be viewed as a sign of failure than success.
• Aftershocks are generally associated with worse outcomes and starting conditions. REER tends to appreciate a few months into an episode unless there is an aftershock, suggesting that real exchange rate overshooting is not a sign of failure, but its absence might be.
• The probability of a large depreciation is slightly lower for countries with fixed exchange rates. However, when they do experience large depreciations, countries that maintain exchange rate flexibility before and after the initial event generally experience milder shocks and have smaller dispersions in maximum REER and NEER depreciations. Keeping the exchange rate flexible after the onset of the large depreciation is associated with stable depreciation. Attempts to peg are associated with a higher likelihood of aftershocks.
• The share of episodes with an IMF-supported program before or during the episode decreased substantially over the last four decades. Interestingly, equilibrium REER depreciations are largest when an IMF-supported program is introduced after the initial depreciation.