Sixth Circuit Rejects FCC’s Open Internet Order as Inconsistent with Statutory Text

This morning, in its second opinion of 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the Federal Communications so-called “Open Internet Order,” a variant of what is often referred to as “net neutrality,” is unlawful. The three-judge panel, consisting of Judges Griffin, Kethledge, and Bush, concluded that the FCC’s regulation was inconsistent with the statutory text of the Telecommunications Act.

Here is how Judge Griffin’s opinion for the panel summarizes the case and its background:

As Congress has said, the Internet has “flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4). The Federal Communications Commission largely followed this command from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by regulating the Internet with a light touch for nearly 15 years after enactment. But since, the FCC’s approach has been anything but consistent.

Beginning in the late 2000s, the FCC undertook several attempts to impose so-called “net neutrality policies,” which prohibit Broadband Internet Service Providers from controlling users’ Internet access—by varying speeds or blocking connections to third-party websites, for example—based on content, commercial agreements, and other reasons a provider might want to manage a user’s Internet experience. Those efforts culminated in 2015, when the FCC concluded for the first time that Broadband Internet Service Providers offer to consumers a “telecommunications service” and thus are common carriers—and subject to extensive regulation (including net-neutrality restrictions)—under Title II of the Communications Act. Id. § 153(51).

Corresponding with a change in administrations, in 2018, the FCC rescinded its 2015 determination and instead reverted to its historical hands-off approach to Internet regulation by concluding that Broadband Internet Service Providers offered only “information service.” Id. § 153(24). That change lifted the net-neutrality requirements.

The D.C. Circuit heard substantial challenges to the 2015 and 2018 orders. It applied the now-overruled Chevron doctrine in each case and upheld both wholly inconsistent regulations as “permissible” under the Act.

Today we consider the latest FCC order, issued in 2024, which resurrected the FCC’s heavy-handed regulatory regime. Under the present Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet Order, Broadband Internet Service Providers are again deemed to offer a “telecommunications service” under Title II and therefore must abide by net-neutrality principles. 89 Fed. Reg. 45404 (May 22, 2024) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20) [hereinafter Safeguarding Order]. But unlike past challenges that the D.C. Circuit considered under Chevron, we no longer afford deference to the FCC’s reading of the statute. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024) (overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Instead, our task is to determine “the best reading of the statute” in the first instance. Id.

Using “the traditional tools of statutory construction,” id., we hold that Broadband Internet Service Providers offer only an “information service” under 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), and therefore, the FCC lacks the statutory authority to impose its desired net-neutrality policies through the “telecommunications service” provision of the Communications Act, id. § 153(51). Nor does the Act permit the FCC to classify mobile broadband—a subset of broadband Internet services—as a “commercial mobile service” under Title III of the Act (and then similarly impose net-neutrality restrictions on those services). Id. § 332(c)(1)(A). We therefore grant the petitions for review and set aside the FCC’s Safeguarding Order.

A few things are notable about the opinion. First, as it notes up front, while the legal fights over net neutrality have gone on for years, this is the first time an appellate court has considered this issue post-Chevron, which makes defending this broad rule more difficult for the FCC. Under Loper Bright Enterprises, the FCC’s view of what constitutes an “information service,” “telecommunications service,” or “commercial mobile service” is due respect, but not deference.

Second, the panel concludes that the FCC’s regulation is inconsistent with the statutory text without having to rely upon the “major questions” doctrine or any other interpretive dice-loading.

Third, as the Sixth Circuit was assigned the case in the multi-circuit lottery, this means the FCC’s Open Internet Order is no more (and an appeal under the Trump Administration is quite unlikely).

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